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Abstract
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The integration of micro-prudential oversight with 
the macro-approach to financial stability—long in 
the making—raises several issues of coordination of 
regulatory responsibilities. This paper argues that a 
decomposition of the covariance of asset returns into an 
endogenous volatility component—which can be reduced 
—and an exogenous volatility component – which we 
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have to live with—helps address these coordination issues 
and provides the basis for financial health diagnostics and 
supervisory responses to observed symptoms of financial 
instability. By linking risk origination and risk control, the 
paper may also contribute to the search for an operational 
definition of the term “macro-prudential.” 
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“The absence of a new economic philosophy that integrates economics and finance has been a 
great failing.”   Henry Kaufman
2 
“During normal times prices can be trusted to reflect the “wisdom of the crowds.” During times 
of distress, investors react instinctively and emotionally: the wisdom of crowds becomes the 
“madness of mobs.”   Andrew W. Lo
3 
 
1.  Introduction 
A series of insightful papers by Crockett (2000) and Borio (2003) in the aftermath of the 
East Asian crisis reached the important conclusion that the conditions for financial 
systems’ stability do not necessarily coincide with those for individual financial 
institutions’ stability. Quite the contrary, the pursuit of the latter often generates 
destabilizing externalities on the system as a whole. They dubbed micro-prudential the 
traditional focus on individual intermediaries – prone to the fallacy of composition – and 
macro-prudential the complementary approach – able to combine the stability of 
individual institutions with a systemic perspective. An integration of the two approaches 
– a marriage – was strongly recommended. 
Yet, the decade separating the East Asian from the Subprime crisis has been dominated 
more by the traditional micro-prudential approach, embedded in the Basel II capital 
accord, than by the development of a new macro-prudential mindset, let alone an 
integration of the two. Only the effects of the dramatic financial crisis of 2007 and its 
legacy of lingering financial instability has brought macro-prudential supervision and 
surveillance to the center of the academic and policy debate and led to the establishment 
of macro-prudential oversight units within financial supervisory authorities worldwide 
(Banca d’Italia, 2009; Bank of England, 2009). 
The question is then: Why did it take so long for the micro and the macro-prudential 
dimensions of financial stability to come together? Why does the marriage – so clearly 
announced more than 10 years ago – take place only now? I argue that the delay largely 
                                                            
2 Financial Times, June 1, 2010. 
3 Financial Times, October 1, 2009. 3 
 
owes to different cultures and paradigms. The different paradigms in this case are partial 
and the general equilibrium, respectively, for the micro and macro-prudential approaches.  
Such a consideration is not new but perhaps deserves further consideration. In fact, 
general and partial equilibrium models of asset pricing provide different explanations and 
testable implications of financial volatility. Should these determinants be found to be 
complementary, a similar conclusion would – most likely – apply to their normative 
implications.  
This paper addresses two questions. First, can different notions of equilibrium help define 
diagnostics and remedies of observed financial instability? Second, are the views and 
remedies of the two – conceptual and regulatory – approaches mutually consistent, and 
can they be integrated or, instead, are they mutually exclusive? 
Since at an aggregate portfolio level total volatility is predominantly shaped by the co-
movement of individual assets (covariance terms dominate variance terms), I focus on the 
covariance of asset returns highlighting their different specifications in partial and 
general equilibrium and their regulatory implications. The analysis suggests that the 
observed instability of asset returns can be decomposed into elements that are largely 
complementary and therefore call for complementary oversight approaches. If the paper 
is convincing, it will offer an insight – if not a complete story – of how the micro and 
macro approaches can come together in a consistent story of risk origination and control. 
The results are related to and consistent with previous studies that have looked into the 
regulatory implications of asset price co-movements (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009). 
The paper begins with a brief review of the determinant of risk (i.e., volatility) in the 
partial and general equilibrium approaches (Section 2) and shows how this leads to 
different characterizations of asset returns and their covariance (Section 3). It then 
describes how the two equilibrium concepts offer different rationales for the co-
movement of returns, leading to a covariance decomposition along the main sources of 
financial volatility (Section 4). Section 5 draws on well known empirical evidence to 
support the proposed notion of covariance decomposition. Section 6 concludes, providing 
a guide to the selection of the appropriate remedy: whether from the panoply of micro or 
macro regulatory and supervisory tools. 4 
 
2.  Financial risk and returns: Two different mindsets 
Borio (2003) pointed to the existence of two complementary – but not yet integrated – 
ways of looking at financial stability. The first, the micro-prudential approach, deals with 
risk from the perspective of standard financial asset pricing and treats individual 
intermediaries as part of a broader portfolio, represented by the whole financial system. 
The effects of financial risk in this approach are contained within the financial system. 
The second approach, referred to as macro-prudential, looks instead at risk from the 
perspective of dynamic macro-financial models and therefore in terms of macroeconomic 
volatility induced by cyclical factors or by multiple equilibriums associated with 
imperfect information and incomplete markets. The consequences of financial risk in this 
approach go beyond the financial system and extend to the real economy. The way both 
risk and its consequences are conceptualized reveals a partial equilibrium ascendance in 
the case of the micro approach and a general equilibrium one in the case of the macro 
approach. 
Financial risk from the partial equilibrium perspective 
The partial equilibrium ascendance may not be obvious in the case of the micro approach 
because asset pricing is part of the construct of modern finance and therefore fits into a 
general equilibrium framework. However, taking a closer look, it becomes apparent that 
asset pricing is largely carved from underlying individuals’ preferences and endowments 
and, as a result of finance separation theorems, financial decisions remain independent of 
individuals’ risk aversion and endowments. 
The notion that individual risk preferences do not affect the composition of the efficient 
portfolio goes back to Tobin and justifies the separation of financial from economic 
decisions. Separation theorems have become a milestone of modern finance and their 
impact on current practices of risk management and control has been pervasive. Ross 
(1976) explicitly referred to this point when he noted that: “Modern financial theory 
derives much of its analytic power from a few strong assumptions it imposes on models it 
develops. Without such assumptions the special problems of the financial theorist 
…would be as intractable and empirically empty in finance as they are in general 5 
 
equilibrium theory. Perhaps the most successful of the theoretical assumptions employed 
has been that of separability” (italics added). 
The efficient market hypothesis and its separation corollary have “de facto” created the 
condition for a partial equilibrium analysis of financial markets. In a figurative sense, it 
could be said that financial economists “outsourced” the general equilibrium perspective 
– and its focus on the interaction of demand and supply forces. They have adopted a 
partial equilibrium perspective, focusing their attention on the arbitrage forces that map 
the equilibrium remuneration of a small number of risk factors into the myriad of 
observed financial asset prices.
4 As mentioned, general equilibrium considerations 
remain relevant but largely outside the scope of enquiry of modern finance. Ross said on 
this matter that, “the forces of demand and supply have no meaning [for finance], since if 
the price is not the equilibrium price, then the difference between supply and demand is 
infinite” (Ross, 1987). Perhaps the most notable exception to this approach, in the field of 
finance, is represented by the consumption CAPM (CCAPM) of Campbell and Cochrane 
(1995), in which an explicitly link is made between asset pricing and consumer 
preferences. 
As a consequence of its partial equilibrium stance prevailing in finance, the two elements 
that concur in the determination of asset returns, the quantity of risk and its price, can be 
seen as exogenous. More precisely, the quantity of systemic risk – e.g., the size of shocks 
to aggregate wealth – is considered exogenous because it is generated exclusively by 
shocks of natural or technological origin. The equilibrium price of risk – the “market 
return” or remuneration of any other risk factor – is instead considered exogenous in the 
special sense that originates outside financial markets as a result of the interaction of 
demand and supply in the “real” side of the economy. 
The broad exogeneity of risk implies that financial risk is something to cope with but 
whose outbursts are beyond regulators’ responsibility and represent, in fact, acts of God. 
In other words, solvency ratios and Value at Risk (VaR) will buy stability up to a selected 
                                                            
4 Ross paraphrased Samuelson’s aphorism that for a parrot to become “a learned political economist, all he 
must learn are two words: supply and demand,” suggesting that for the same parrot to become a learned 
financial economist only one word was needed: “arbitrage.” Summers (1985) famously mocked this notion, 
dubbing finance “Ketchup Economics.” 6 
 
probability level of crisis occurrence, but will not affect the probability of occurrence of 
the crisis itself. Regulation and supervision, in fact, do not affect the distribution of asset 
returns. Even in those cases where regulation and supervision are entrusted with 
removing market imperfections financial risk remains largely a fact of nature – not a fruit 
of human actions – providing a strong justification for self-regulation as a tool of 
effective supervision. 
Financial risk from the general equilibrium perspective 
The alternative framework that stands today behind the macro regulatory approach has 
been moving away from the finance perspective. This shift began in the 1970s, when 
Cass and Stiglitz (1970) emphasized the restrictive nature of the functional assumptions 
on which finance separation theorems rested. Other tenets of finance that have come 
under fire over time are the no-arbitrage assumption and the convexity of the investment 
set. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) found the presence of positive arbitrage margins to be 
the very condition for market existence. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) pointed to the 
significant non-convexities that real world investment policies face as a result of 
imperfect information and incomplete markets. On empirical grounds, Shiller (1981) – 
and large number of empirical studies following his seminal contribution – showed that 
observed stock market volatility is not explained by the expectation of subsequent 
dividends.  
However, it was only in the 1990s that the imperfect information paradigm generated a 
rich literature on the impact of financial intermediation on economic activity. This 
literature succeeded in presenting financial risk as the endogenous outcome of a general 
equilibrium framework. Kiotaky and Moore (1997)and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1999) helped establish the link between the dynamics of asset prices and output and the 
role played by real and financial assets as collateral in lending operations. The imperfect 
information also paradigm underlies the classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of 
banking crises and its multiple equilibria characterization of bank runs. What is common 
to both models of economic cycles and banking crises is the fact that systemic non-
diversifiable risk may be generated by the behavior of economic agents and can therefore 7 
 
be endogenous.
5 This notably brings financial instability – both cyclical instability and 
full-fledged financial crises – under the responsibility of financial authorities, suggesting 
that countervailing actions are within the reach of policy makers. Yet, for all their 
flexibility, general equilibrium models are cumbersome constructions with large strings 
of parameters that prevent them from becoming a reliable operational guide to asset 
trading and risk management. As a result, imperfect information – now a standard feature 
of micro and macroeconomic analysis – never made significant inroads into financial 
asset pricing. 
A noteworthy exception to these trends is represented by the “endogenous risk in 
finance” approach spearheaded by Shin (2008), which brings the general equilibrium 
mindset to the derivation of asset prices. Supporters of this approach observe that 
idiosyncratic shocks at times grow out of proportion and that the resulting noise 
magnification may reach systemic relevance, as in the case of banking and financial 
crises. They share with the macro-financial approach the observation that feedback 
mechanisms, built into existing regulations or balance sheet constraints, tend to magnify 
(accelerate) exogenous shocks that would have otherwise limited economic impact. They 
share with the micro approach the focus on the determinants of asset returns. 
The distinguishing feature of the macro-prudential literature is represented by the 
rejection of a self-contained financial reality and the acknowledgment that financial 
systems may affect the risk profile of the whole economy. According to the macro-
financial approach, crisis episodes are “process generated events.” They are associated 
with distributions of returns that move over time and whose parameters are the solution 
of a market equilibrium problem. In other words, financial instability is not the result of 
unfortunate realizations of occurrences located far away in the tail of the distribution but 
of the realization of different return (and risk) distributions over time and across 
countries. The resulting responsibility of financial supervisors in control of the financial 
intermediation activity is largely expanded. 
 
                                                            
5 Haldane (2010) reaches a similar conclusion: “Tail risk within some systems is determined by God, in 
economist-speak, it is exogenous … Tail risk within financial systems is not determined by God but by 
man; it is not exogenous but endogenous.” 8 
 
3.  Asset returns and their covariance in the two approaches 
The link between the partial and general-equilibrium approaches and their regulatory 
projections – the micro and macro – and a specific characterization of financial risk is 
reflected by key risk parameters such as the covariance and correlation of asset returns. 
This section compares returns and their covariance in the conceptual and regulatory 
perspectives described so far, moving from simple to complex. It looks at returns in a 
micro-prudential world and in a macro-prudential world where endogenous risk is caused 
by idiosyncratic shocks or systemic shocks. 
The micro approach 
A traditional risk factor specification of an asset return would take the form of Equation 
1, in which returns are a function of the vector of risk factor loadings β and risk 
premiums, x. If the risk factor is unique and approximated by the “market” excess return 
over the riskless rate, then equation 1 reduces to the CAPM. 
1                 ,                .                                                        .   . . . 0,1  
                                                                                                                    . . .   ,   
   
The covariance of financial returns depends uniquely on the systemic component (σm) 
due to the i.i.d. assumption of the random variable (εi,t). 
2                     ,    ,            
  
Equation 2 shows that asset returns move together only if they are exposed to common 
risk factors. This reflects the notion described in the previous section that risk is 
exogenous and that financial regulators cannot do much apart from enforcing a 
predefined level of self-insurance on the part of supervised intermediaries. 
The macro approach with endogenous transmission of idiosyncratic risk 
In a macro-financial approach asset returns are still a function of the relevant risk factors 
– presumably a set of macroeconomic variables – and their factor loadings but their 
volatility term is more complex. Equation 3 translates in discrete time the return equation 
derived by Danielsson et al. (2009) from a structural model of liquidity demand and 
supply. The authors characterize the volatility term as the result of two additive 9 
 
components: an idiosyncratic component (σi), as in equation 2, and an additional term 
accounting for the effects of idiosyncratic shocks on other assets that are transmitted via a 
correlation matrix (Pi,j) whose off-diagonal elements differ from zero, reflecting existing 
budget or liquidity constraints. 
3                   ,                .                                 .   . . 0,∑   ,   ,   ,      
                                                                                                  . . .   ,    
   
The covariance of asset returns is now affected by the presence of a new source of return 
correlation (ρi,j) that is independent and additional to the common risk factor:  
4                    ,    ,            
      ,         
The additional cross-correlation term reflects the price effect of “fire-sales” triggered, for 
example, by sudden capital alignment with required VaR levels (Danielsson et al., 2009) 
or by margin calls (Adrian and Shin, 2009). 
Feedback rules violate the traditional i.i.d. assumption of residuals in the asset pricing 
equations: idiosyncratic shocks are no longer uncorrelated across assets and spillovers 
affect the covariance matrix. As a result, the covariance of returns in the macro-financial 
approach depends on the volatility of the underlying risk factors (  
   as in equation 2 
and on feedback rules (  ,       . The sources of systemic risk are now both exogenous 
(      
   and endogenous (  ,       , and financial regulators’ responsibilities have 
greater latitude. In addition to enforcing a predefined level of self-insurance (solvency 
ratios) – as in the micro-partial equilibrium case – they now have to offset endogenously 
created volatility. This description of asset returns largely reflects the price dynamics 
described by the Brady Commission on the 1987 stock market crash, where a myriad of 
parallel hedging transactions enacted by institutional investors in a seemingly 
uncoordinated fashion were in fact coordinated by the use of similar trading models.  
The macro approach with endogenous transmission of exogenous shocks 
Borio (2003) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) observe that not only idiosyncratic 
but also systemic shocks are magnified by the existence of feedback rules. For example, a 
positive productivity shock will negatively affect the returns of existing capital assets, 10 
 
inducing losses for those financial intermediaries that have invested in the now obsolete 
assets. Portfolio “fire sales” by intermediaries that have fallen below their solvency ratios 
will generate additional negative pressure on prices and returns that further reinforce the 
negative price spiral. If the same balance sheet and liquidity constraints are triggered by 
both idiosyncratic and systemic shocks (i.e., the same correlation matrix applies to 
idiosyncratic and systemic shocks), then the return equation becomes: 
5                   ,                .                                   .   . . 0,∑   ,   ,   ,      
                                                                                  . . . 0,    
    
                                                                                                    .   . . 0,∑   ,   ,   ,      
The covariance of asset returns described in equation 5 can be decomposed into three 
elements: one related to the idiosyncratic component and two related to systemic risk 
factors.  
6                      ,            
          ,   ,   ,      ,   ,   ,    
It is interesting to observe that the new cross-correlation element related to systemic 
shocks is generated by feedback mechanisms associated with the existence of system-
wide constraints that magnify the impact of systemic shocks, such as predefined loan-to-
value ratios (Fisher, 1933) or loan-to-net worth ratios (Bernanke et al., 1999).Equation 6 
shows that in the absence of feedback effects (i.e., for ρi,j=0), the covariance of asset 
returns reverts to the specification of equation 2. Asset volatility in the partial 
equilibrium-micro-prudential approach appears to be a special case of the general 
equilibrium-macro prudential framework. The recent literature on endogenous risk seems 
therefore to suggest that the macro-approach should not be seen as an alternative view of 
risk and stability but as an inclusive framework. It is well suited to provide the integrated 
approach to financial regulation and supervision that is needed to jointly address the 
concerns of the macro and micro-prudential approach. 
The two expressions for the covariance in equations 2 and 6 are mindful, when 
aggregated at the system level, of the notions of VaR and CoVaR discussed in Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2009). Equation 2 corresponds to their unconditional VaR measure; 
equation 6 to their CoVaR measure, conditional on some level of distress being 11 
 
transmitted throughout the system. Finally, the difference between equations 6 and 2 – 
given by the last two terms of equation 6 – largely resembles their ΔCoVaR measure, 
since it captures the externalities that individual asset volatilities would fail to capture. 
4.  Volatility, correlation, and market health 
The fact that asset returns under the micro approach may represent a special case of the 
specification under the macro approach is helpful on two counts. First, it implies that the 
specifications of the covariance of asset returns provided by the two approaches may 
shed light on the nature of the observed volatility: whether it is of the “unavoidable” (i.e., 
nature driven or exogenous) variety
6 or the “problematic” (i.e., manmade and 
endogenous) variety. Second, it provides the rationale for the construction of a whole 
family of empirical indicators that may guide regulators and supervisors in the selection 
of the appropriate policy response to observed volatility of returns. Equations 2 and 6 
suggest the following covariance decomposition, where the observed covariance of asset 
returns is the result of an exogenous risk component, fully accounted for by the micro-
prudential approach, and a residual that reflects the endogenous risk components. 
7)  Observed covariance = Exogenous Covariance + Endogenous Covariance 
When aggregated over total assets at the system level, equation 7 largely coincides with 
system total volatility due to the fact that both the variance terms and the i.i.d. 
idiosyncratic shocks tend to zero over large portfolios. The ratio of exogenous covariance 
over observed covariance provides a signal of the state of the health of the financial 
system at the level of a specific couple of assets or, if aggregated across all assets in the 
economy, at the level of the system as a whole. Accordingly, the proposed indicator is 
labeled the Indicator of Market Health (IMH)
 7: 
                                                            
6 Given this paper’s focus on supervisory responsibilities, the notion of “unavoidable” volatility refers to the 
volatility that is beyond the influence of financial supervisors and regulators such as macroeconomic volatility not 
induced by financial factors. This broader – non financially induced - macroeconomic volatility which is exogenous 
for financial authorities may still be affected by macroeconomic policy  
7 The ratio is analogous to that used by Mitchell and Stafford (1999) to correct for cross-correlation bias in 
the t test for firms’ specific effect. They build a ratio of (average) variance under independence over 
(average) total variance to remove the inference bias that weakens tests of market efficiency; I look at the 
ratio of independent over total covariance as an indicator of endogenous risk presence. 12 
 
8                                         , ;    
    , ; 
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          ; 
 
 
    , ; 
         
Values of the IMH close to one and stable would point to good health. Low or decreasing 
values of the IMH would, instead, signal problems and call for action. The analogy 
between health and stability is reinforced by the similar role played by covariance in 
financial systems and by cholesterol in human health. Both covariance and cholesterol 
are necessary ingredients in their own systems; they both come in beneficial an damaging 
forms and the health of their respective systems depends on the share of the damaging 
component; they both can be controlled by means of preventive discipline; and if left 
unchecked, both can be fatal. The question remains whether an empirical test can be 
devised that is as simple and reliable as that for cholesterol.  
Although this paper’s focus is deliberately not empirical, the last term in equation 8 
points to possible estimation strategies of the proposed indicator. There is a growing flow 
of empirical evidence that appears broadly consistent with the proposed approach, such 
as the measurement proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) of the unconditional 
VaR (related to the exogenous covariance term) and ΔCoVaR (related to the endogenous 
covariance term). A promising line of empirical verification may be offered by 
partitioning historical data into periods closer to equilibrium – where estimation of the 
betas could be undertaken – and periods where instead the presence of endogenous risk 
would violate standard regularity assumptions. The identification of suitable sample 
periods or appropriate controls for estimation of the betas’ (    ,     ) makes it possible to 
derive a proxy of return covariance in absence of endogenous risk (    , ; 
     . . 
Aggregating bilateral indicators for the whole market along the lines suggested by Engle 
(2009) or through a simple portfolio aggregation would provide a comprehensive 
indicator of market health.  
The results on asset covariance can immediately be transposed to asset correlation, a key 
parameter for policy decisions. This would hopefully facilitate drawing policy 
conclusions from the analysis, a task that is discussed in the last section of the paper. In 
fact, the covariance decomposition between exogenous and endogenous components 
closely matches that of the correlation coefficients. In particular, the ratio of exogenous 13 
 
correlation (i.e., conditional on independent idiosyncratic terms) to total correlation 
depends on the IMH and a scale factor (SF), as illustrated in greater detail in Annex 1. 
  9                                
  , ; 
     .
  , ; 
       
    , ; 
     .
    , ; 
                     , ;         
Equation 9 shows that, within a factor of proportionality, the ratio of correlation 
coefficients follows the IMH, suggesting that what works for the latter works for the first 
and that the IMH may help understand what factors affect the movements of observed 
asset price correlation over time. 
The  IMH offers a criterion to distinguish “micro” from “macro” supervisors’ 
responsibilities  that may be judged far from satisfactory in that it identifies “macro” 
responsibilities with the unexplained portion of asset return variance. However, this is a 
feature that the endogenous component of volatility shares with other variables at the 
center of policymakers’ attention, such as total factor productivity (TFP), which has often 
been called a “measure of our ignorance.”  
It is to be expected, almost by definition, that market based measures of externalities are 
bound to remain largely imprecise. However – as highlighted by the examples described 
in the next section – prices do reflect the presence of externalities. They do not price the 
externality itself but they do reflect the effect externalities have on equilibrium prices. In 
other words, incomplete markets, while an obstacle to timely and focused risk pricing, do 
not preclude signals of tensions – spillovers – from surfacing in the economy.  
The indicator is meant to intercept spillovers induced volatility and separate it from “non 
spillover” generated volatility. As such, it offers a “first aid kit” that leaves to the skilled 
supervisor the difficult task of relating observed symptoms to appropriate diagnostics. 
And, as documented by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), endogenous risk can be 
econometrically related to a set of observable variables and forecasted. Finally, 
regularities that apply to market traded assets may generate informed judgments for 
assets that are not traded, suggesting that the relevance of the IMH may extend well 
beyond the sphere of marked-to-market assets and listed institutions. 
 14 
 
5.  Empirical evidence of endogenous risk 
The usefulness of the proposed correlation decomposition for policy purposes is better 
illustrated with reference to some empirical evidence. To this end, I shall describe how 
the IMH would behave in a few selected and well known episodes where correlation is 
affected by endogenous and exogenous risk. The first set of evidence illustrates time 
series of correlation coefficients exposed to idiosyncratic shocks with and without 
endogenous transmission mechanisms at play. The second set of evidence shows the 
different correlation between large positive and large negative returns reflecting, again, 
the asymmetric presence of endogenous transmission mechanisms. 
Independent versus correlated idiosyncratic shocks 
The empirical evidence provided by several recent studies
8 shows that idiosyncratic 
volatility (  ,   has been growing in size with respect to factor induced volatility (      ) 
since the 1960s, weakening the average cross-correlation among U.S. stock returns. The 
trend is illustrated by Figure 1, taken from Campbell et al. (2001), which shows the 
declining average total correlation among U.S. stocks measured over a 5-year period 
(upper line) and 1-year period (lower line). The trend is abruptly interrupted in October 
1987 as a result of the previously described spike in the endogenous component of 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
Figure 1 
Source: Campbell et al. (2003). 
                                                            
8 Campbell et al. (2001, 2003). 15 
 
As expected, correlation fell over the decades as the independently distributed 
idiosyncratic error (  , ) grew in size, but it increased when the cross-correlated 
idiosyncratic error (  , ) peaked in 1987. The IMH would not have recorded the growth 
of uncorrelated idiosyncratic risk over the 40-year sample but would have fallen in 
October 1987 as a result of the stock market crash. 
Further evidence of the presence of endogenous risk is also provided by the remarkable 
instability of the correlation of two stock market indexes – Dow Jones and NASDAQ – 
when both indices should be free, by construction, from the effect of i.i.d. shocks and 
should record only shocks related to the exogenous risk factor.  
Figure 2        Ten Years of DJ-NASDAQ Correlations 
Source: Engle (2002). 
Figure 2, taken from Engle (2002), shows that the correlation of the two stock market 
indexes has historically displayed oscillations at a much higher frequency than would be 
justified by the simple difference of factor loadings. This implies that some endogenous 
mechanism of transmission of idiosyncratic or systemic risk has most likely been at play. 
Cross-correlated negative versus independent positive idiosyncratic shocks 
Empirical evidence also shows that the correlation of large shocks is higher when they 
are negative and it is not volatility per se that affects correlations but “downside” 
volatility. “Upside” volatility, on the contrary, does not appear to affect the correlations. 
This pattern is counterintuitive because volatility patterns should be symmetric and 
correlation values should decrease (not increase as observed) when errors grow in size, 16 
 
leaving very large errors totally uncorrelated. Nevertheless, Longin and Solnik (2001) 
find that U.S. and European stock market returns are instead characterized by i) higher 
than expected correlation of large (low frequency) return variations, and ii) departure 
from normality that is fully attributable to “extreme negative” returns. This evidence may 
be due to an omitted factor affecting negative returns but, most likely, cross-correlation 
of returns is caused by feedback rules, triggered by negative surprises. 
Figure 3.   U.S. Large and Small Stock Correlation versus a Multivariate Normal  
Source: Ang and Chen (2002). 
Figure 3, taken from Ang and Chen (2002), supports Longin and Solnik’s findings and is 
suggestive of how feedback rules may be triggered by downside returns. The chart plots 
the observed pattern of return correlations for large traded U.S. stocks and for small 
traded U.S. stocks together with their theoretical multivariate normal distribution. The 
asymmetry of correlation patterns is confirmed. For both large and small size stocks, the 
deviation from the theoretical pattern is considerably larger for negative (left side of the 
chart) than for positive (right side) returns. The chart also shows that deviations are much 
larger for small stocks (lower part of the chart) than for large stocks (upper part), 
supporting a link between the asymmetry of observed correlations and the degree of 
market liquidity, which is notably much higher for large than for small stocks. Typically 
the IMH would have shown higher values for large stocks than for small stocks, pointing 
to the higher likelihood that the prices of small stocks may deviate from fundamentals, 
due to market structure induced frictions.  17 
 
The two examples provide a flavor of the role that risk of the endogenous variety may 
have played in the observed correlation patterns, how the IMH would have behaved, and 
the messages it could have conveyed to policy makers. 
6.  Regulatory implications 
The covariance (and correlation) decomposition described in previous sections may help in the 
diagnosis of the causes of financial instability and selection of the appropriate remedies for the 
observed symptoms. To make this point clearer, this section considers the two market conditions 
of normality (|ρ| 1) and distress (|ρ| 1). It illustrates in both cases the policy implications of 
total volatility dominated by “unavoidable” volatility (IMH 1 ) and “problematic” volatility 
(IMH 0 ). The four cases span a broad set of policy issues.  
Market normality 
The first case is market normality when the absolute value of observed correlation coefficients is 
dispersed between zero and one. In this case, financial regulators and supervisors may view their 
actions as redundant and consider it appropriate to delegate oversight to self-regulatory discipline 
on the part of market players. 
Is this approach justified? If the IMH values are stable and close to one, the answer is yes and a 
minimalist approach to regulation and supervision would be supported by the data. An IMH 
value close to one would signal that observed volatility is predominantly of the “unavoidable” 
(exogenous) variety and self-insurance provides an effective remedy. More generally, the 
combination of a low correlation coefficient and a high IMH suggests low levels of manmade 
volatility and a preference for rules over discretion as a tool to keep manmade distortions to a 
minimum in an environment that is still largely unaffected by them. 
If, instead, the IMH values are low or decreasing, an alarm bell would ring even if observed 
correlation levels were (observationally) similar to the previous case and apparently close to 
normality. In this latter case, in fact, observed volatility would be largely – or increasingly – of 
the manmade variety. This would signal that, despite the appearance of normality, markets would 
perform their diversification function well below potential, possibly due to endogenous volatility 
caused by feedback rules. The wide correlation swings observed in the two stock market indexes 18 
 
in the previous section suggest, for example, the presence of liquidity constraints also in normal 
times, which, if addressed, would further stabilize and reduce observed correlations.  
Moreover, the ability to detect manmade volatility in a timely manner is key to remove its causes 
or offset its effects. Ad hoc interventions may be required to deactivate/offset the feedback rules. 
Examples include measures as diverse as temporary capital controls to rein in liquidity tensions 
(the Republic of Korea has successfully adopted targeted capital controls recently), anti-cyclical 
use of bank reserves (spearheaded by Spain and Colombia), and gradual implementation of 
tighter bank solvency ratios to avoid destabilizing effects on economic activity (Basel III). Low 
levels of correlation and a low or falling IMH point to situations where volatility is not 
threatening financial stability but is largely of manmade origin. In this environment, which is 
likely to characterize the large majority of cases, ad-hoc regulatory interventions are likely to be 
needed and a good deal of discretion may be needed. 
Market distress 
The case of market distress may be characterized rapidly growing correlation of returns. Here the 
case for public intervention seems rather uncontroversial. When markets have become one sided 
and market activity has come to a halt, regulators must surrogate the market on a temporary base. 
The question is therefore not whether public intervention is needed but what form of intervention 
is likely to be most effective and whether the IMH provides additional help in the selection of 
appropriate crisis management tools. The answer – albeit a tentative one – is that the IMH helps 
distinguish between different forms of intervention: the provision of insurance and the provision 
of liquidity. For example, a very high IMH would signal that, given the largely exogenous nature 
of observed volatility, solutions to the crisis must be found outside the financial system. In such 
an environment, the protection of financial intermediation would not be insured purely by 
liquidity support but would need to extend to the provision of capital and insurance injections 
(Caballero, 2010). The rationale for public intervention would be the classic Arrow and Lind 
(1970) argument, based on governments’ “unparalleled risk spreading capacity” across taxpayers 
and cohorts of taxpayers. This would point to government as the only available source of risk 
management and diversification at a time when market based technologies have broken down. 
An IMH that would remain low or decreasing even when entering a situation of crisis would 
instead signal the endogeneity of destabilizing forces. This would suggest that crisis management 19 
 
would require the timely removal of those feedback mechanisms that are reinforcing the price 
spiral and a simultaneous and generous provision of liquidity to offset the liquidity drainage that 
is taking place in the economy. Concerns are often raised about the effects of such an aggressive 
policy stance on market incentives. However, it must be noted that, in a world dominated by unit 
correlation coefficients, market discipline and its benefits have already evaporated. In such an 
environment, when moral hazard prevents the provision of liquidity or guarantees by the private 
sector (Rochet, 2005), the public provision of liquidity appears to be the only viable alternative. 
The different combinations of endogenous and exogenous risk in the four cases just considered 
portend situations characterized by different probability distributions of asset returns 
corresponding to different states of the world. The situation is fundamentally different from the 
old micro-prudential approach – where only exogenous risk mattered – and only one probability 
distribution of returns needed to be considered. The regulatory implications raised by the new 
perspective are broad and complex. Three orders of implications are briefly reviewed below to 
help sketch the nature of the problems at hand: a) state-contingent regulation; b) regulation 
externalities; and c) risk of market concentration. 
State contingent regulation 
In a context where returns are generated by probability distributions that change according to the 
prevailing state of the world, the number of policy responses must be larger than in a world 
dominated by a single probability distribution of asset returns. Supervisory and regulatory 
practices around the world provide innumerable examples of policy responses that are hardly 
codified within the old micro-prudential approach: anti-cyclical prudential practices are a point 
in case. Many of these cases of “unorthodox” interventions in the financial system would acquire 
an “orthodox” qualification in the new integrated approach along the lines of the well known 
aphorism according to which “virtues” in normal times (i.e., market based policies) become 
“vices” in times of distress, and “vices” in normal times (i.e., government based policies) 
suddenly become “virtues” when crises strike.  
The challenge of a “state dependent” regulatory discipline consists of the definition of a new 
“cone of authority” for financial regulators and supervisors that may effectively limit their 
responsibilities and prevent the undesirable outcome that overextended tasks may undermine 
their independence, weakening the governance of the whole prudential oversight process. 20 
 
Regulation externalities 
Both the micro and macro-prudential approaches share a common concern about the 
destabilizing externalities of regulatory instruments. The micro approach is concerned with the 
externalities associated with crisis-contingent policies, such as the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) 
and the provision of deposit insurance. In fact, it is feared that in both cases, the very availability 
of these tools – while defusing self-fulfilling runs – could feed instability through the familiar 
moral hazard channel. In the integrated micro-macro approach, the same set of considerations 
would extend to a much larger set of regulatory provisions and form of externalities, an example 
being the cyclical externalities of solvency rules. Externalities would become a standard feature 
of regulation. The notion that regulatory tools respond to market imperfections – for example, 
the LOLR as a response to moral hazard – would not make them immune to having parallel and 
possibly unintended effects. From this perspective, the traditional concern about the moral 
hazard implications of the financial safety net does not lose its validity; it simply becomes one 
element of a much larger puzzle (Rochet, 2005; Caballero, 2010). 
Market concentration 
A survey of the regulatory implications of the integrated-prudential approach would be 
incomplete if it did not mention the specific effect of market concentration on endogenous risk. 
For the “public choice view,” the risk of excessive concentration of market power was linked to 
the risk of “regulatory capture” by concentrated special interests. For the “public interest view,” 
market concentration generates rent seeking strategies aimed at expropriating consumers of their 
surplus and small savers of their wealth. In both cases, the damage to social welfare comes from 
a monopolistic concentration of power. In the case studied here, instead, the damage comes from 
the fact that portfolios and institutions of growing size do not ensure the traditional 
diversification benefits expected of their smaller counterparties. Idiosyncratic risk growing in 
size ceases to be diversifiable and becomes an additional source of endogenous risk. The effects 
of market concentration are likely to be further magnified by the concurrent effect of complexity, 
which grows more than linearly with size, as exemplified by the Lehman’s case. 
The goal of preserving market effectiveness by introducing size limits has not been addressed so 
far by existing regulations, which have limited outright prohibitions to the domain of allowed 
bank activities as in the case of the Volker clause. Careful monitoring of the market shares of 21 
 
financial intermediaries appears to be a relevant complement to the menu of financial stability 
instruments. To avoid this – especially in times of financial distress – what is gained through the 
adoption of financial stability measures can be offset by the market concentration caused by the 
consolidation that occurs during crises. Market concentration has also been an outcome of the 
globalization of the financial industry. The emergence of financial conglomerates, often larger 
than the size of their country of origin, challenges the very rationale for (and credibility of) 
public intervention based on governments’ “unrivalled” risk-sharing capacity. These are some of 
the implications of the linkages between size and correlation. Analysis of these complex issues is 
left for future research. 
7.  Conclusions 
Considering the partial equilibrium-micro-prudential approach as a specific case of the macro-
general equilibrium approach to financial stability has two orders of implications. First, the 
macro-prudential approach ceases to represent an alternative to the micro approach and becomes 
the framework for an integrated micro-macro approach to financial stability policies. Second, if 
volatility sources considered by the micro-prudential approach are a subset of the sources of total 
observed volatility, then a decomposition of observed return correlations may rank by their 
quantitative relevance the explanations and remedies provided by the two approaches. The 
decomposition may also help in the detection of different sources of risk – exogenous and 
endogenous. It could link them to specific regulations and controls, providing a basis for the 
division of tasks among different regulatory bodies and a reference point in the definition of the 
architecture and governance of financial regulation and oversight. 
The decomposition of return covariance and correlation also helps characterize different aspects 
of otherwise observationally equivalent asset volatility patterns. As a conceptual benchmark, it 
may guide the choice of the appropriate response to outbursts of endogenous versus exogenous 
risk. It may also help address the volatility implications of growing financial market 
concentration under the twin pressure of crisis induced consolidation and financial globalization. 
The ability of the integrated prudential approach to address a broader set of challenges comes at 
the cost of increased complexity of policy analysis. The broader focus of the micro-macro 
integrated approach requires dropping the implicit assumption that observed returns are samples 
from a single distribution of returns in favor of the alternative that the observed return 22 
 
distribution is itself a sample from the larger family of return distributions. Uncertainty moves 
one step up. Regulatory and supervisory responses will have to adapt to this more complex 
environment. The response to different return distributions may call for different menus of 
regulatory instruments; that is, regulatory policies will have to take a state-contingent stance. 
Rules will lose their simplicity and discretion will play a greater role in their application. 
Governance of the financial regulatory and oversight discipline will be affected as well. 23 
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ANNEX 1:   Endogenous risk and the correlation of asset returns 
  
A decomposition of the correlation coefficient of asset returns 
A general specification of asset returns, inclusive of both exogenous and endogenous risk 
factors, derived from the macro-general equilibrium framework can be expressed as 
follows: 
    1                                                ,      ,          ,      ,     
Equation A-1 is consistent with the characterization of asset returns, in the presence of 
feedback rules, provided by Danielsson et al. (2009). See the characterization of the 
return process as provided in eq. 30 of their paper. The two components of the volatility 
term in equation A-1 offer the basis for an empirical characterization of market integrity, 
since dominance of the feedback component puts the integrity of market signals (prices) 
at risk. Indeed, Danielsson et al. show that prices provide a perverse coordination 
mechanism that magnifies, instead of reducing, the emergence of excess demand or 
supply in the market.  
In particular, the ratio of “unavoidable” correlation to “total” correlation has two 
components: the ratio of covariances and a scale factor related to the level of volatility. 
The first component cohincides with our indicator of market health (IMH). The second 
with a scale factor that accounts also for non financial factors induced volatility such as 
idiosyncratic volatility. In fact, the numerator of the IMH coincides with fundamentals 
induced co-movements (when residuals are independent). The denominator of the IMH is 
given by the sum of both fundamentals and feedbacks-induced co-movements.
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In other words, the numerator of the IMH represents the covariance that is induced by 
exposure to a common risk factor (or to common risk factors in a multifactor setting), 
while the denominator shows total covariance. Under the correct pricing model, market 
integrity would be signaled by a ratio equal to one. A ratio equal to zero would instead 
indicate that asset return co-movements are entirely caused by the market structure (i.e., 
manmade) and not by the exposure to exogenous sources of risk. Decreasing values of 
the indicator would also signal a growing relevance of non-structural risk factors. The 
                                                            
9 The ratio is analogous to the correction terms that Mitchell and Stafford (1999) adopt to correct for cross-
correlation bias in the t test for firms’ specific effect. They build a ratio of (average) variance under 
independence over (average) total variance to remove the inference bias that weakens tests of market 
efficiency; I look at the ratio of independent over total covariance as a potential indicator of market 
efficiency failures.     27 
 
relevance of endogenous risk for a portfolio of N assets would be signaled by the modal 
value of bilateral IMH indicators.  